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Pesticide Regulation:
Why Not Preventive Legislation?
Technological advancements are, by and large, inspired by economic
considerations. They are spurred by motives to reduce labor and pro-
duction costs, and to increase profits. In the twentieth century, man has
implemented many such technological improvements, which have
usually brought about their expected benefits. In his haste to advance
and improve technology, however, man has created new problems, more
complex and dangerous than those he originally sought to solve. It
seems that pollution, ominous and difficult to control, lies invariably in
the wake of technological innovation.
This discussion deals with one type of pollution-that of our food
supply by the chemical residue of pesticides. It will show that the tradi-
tional means of regulation used to eliminate the hazards posed by pesti-
cide residue are inappropriate and ineffective. If protection of human
health is the rationale for environmental control and regulation, then
adequate means of achieving this worthy goal should be adopted. It is
suggested that the traditional political process of regulation should yield
to a more scientific process of regulation. Regulation, preventive in
nature and based on scientific data, would achieve more efficiently the
purpose of environmental control by giving greater consideration to
preventing potential harm, rather than merely attempting to rectify past
harm, as the political process has done.
1. THE DILEMMA
The question boils down to whether to proceed with regulation given an
imperfect and ambiguous scientific base or wait until further data has
been collected . . . waiting for a body count before regulating is an
approach which is hardly the mark of a civilized society.'
This critique on the federal regulation of environmental contami-
nants expresses the growing concern-over human exposure to hazardous
I. Karstadt, Protecting Public Health from Hazardous Substances: Federal Reg-
ulation of Environmental Contaminants, 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 50176 (1975).
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substances. However, the solution to this problem can be achieved only
within specified guidelines and boundaries, which also mark a civilized
society.
Laws which embody these guidelines reflect a balancing of adverse
interests. Specifically in pesticide regulation, legislatures and courts are
confronted with the task of balancing the chemical producers' demands
for a free and unfettered market, with the environmentalists' pleas for
strict constraints to avert the frightening proposition of an indiscrimi-
nately polluted environment. The difficulty of this balancing process
increases when a present benefit is counterbalanced by a potential
future harm. Within the legal framework of assessing the propensity and
gravity of a future uncertainty, the ability of present circumstances to
indicate reliably the occurrence of a future event is determinative. The
understanding of present circumstances, however, is limited by existing
technological knowledge and scientific expertise. Predicting future
events from them is extremely difficult, especially in the field of environ-
mental health, where dealing with the unknown and unpredictable is not
uncommon.2 Invariably, under the legal process, such a balancing stan-
dard has resulted in the scales of regulation being favorably tilted to the
chemical producer's demands.
The legal approach to resolving problems has failed to protect the
American people and their environment from exposure to pesticide pol-
lution. Its major flaw is that it does not adequately compensate for the
lack of conclusive scientific evidence of potential harm. Those entrusted
to make environmental decisions, particularly legislators, should adopt
a standard that would emphasize the potential health hazards posed by
the heavy use of pesticide chemicals. Such an approach which allots
greater concern to future consequences would better protect the environ-
ment for future generations.
The scientific approach to decision-making, by comparison, is ori-
ented much more toward the future. The scientific method discourages
2. Questions involving the environment are particularly prone to uncertainty.
Technological man has altered his world in ways never before experienced or antici-
pated. The health effects of such alterations are often unknown. This language was used
by the Court in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 11976] 8 EN vIR. REP.
(BNA) 1785, 1801. (Not officially reported. For further discussion of case, see note 120
infra.)
For discussion on the amount of scientific knowledge available for regulatory
decisions, see E. Burger, Regulation and Health: How Solid Is Our Foundation, 5
ENvIR. L. REP. 50, 179 (1975).
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hasty action, especially if the consequences of that action cannot be
predicted. Rather, if uncertainty exists, the major concern of the scien-
tific method is to refrain from action until such time as scientific knowl-
edge allows a reasonable prediction of future events.
The differences between the legal and the scientific approaches may
be best distinguished in their different interpretations of such terms as
"cause" and "proof." For example, to prove a hypothesis successfully,
a scientist must use certified evidence, in which the probability of error
by standard statistical measurements must generally be less than 5%.3
Likewise, to show cause, a scientist must prove his hypothesis by rigid
laboratory experiments. In the judicial or administrative process,
however, testimony by a scientist, given in his professional capacity, can
be deemed competent proof and can establish that the likelihood of
occurrence of a certain event is simply more probable than not.4
The legal requirements of cause and proof have burdened the ef-
forts of those attempting to regulate suspected harmful substances. Reg-
ulation through the legal framework has been proven inadequate in
other areas of society, with the resulting problems being resolved only
by stricter legislation.5 The regulation of environmental contaminants,
e.g., pesticide chemicals, has apparently run that same frustrating
gamut. Legalities have hampered not only the regulators' enforcement
procedures, but their administrative and perfunctory duties as well.
Implementation of stricter legislation, employing scientific concepts,
would remove the burden of having to show that a harm is more likely
than not to occur. Conversely, pesticide manufacturers would clearly
have to establish that their products are safe. This type of legislation
would include standards mandating the complete testing of all sub-
stances before they could be mass-produced. If their full effects were not
ascertainable, their production would not be permitted. Such legislation
would foster the application of a scientific approach, because it would
force the support of research which hopefully would remove the limita-
tions of existing scientific predictive knowledge. At present, those to
3. Comment, 21 S. D. L. REv. 425, 427 n.9 (1976), citing Judge Wright for the
majority decision in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 176 U.S. App.
D.C. 373, 541 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2263 (1976).
4. Id. In most civil proceedings, a preponderance of the evidence test is used,
which demands only a certainty of 51%.
5. "Workmen's compensation legislation grew out of the frustration of trying to
recover damages within the framework of negligence law. . . ." YANNACONE V. &
COHEN B., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES at 6 (1971).
95 1
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whom is allotted the task of regulating pesticide residues found in foods
are confronted by the dilemma of which approach to use, scientific or
legal. Agricultural codes and federal regulations, entangled among legal
and technical considerations, essentially ignore the serious ecological
shortcomings inherent in the use of modern pesticides.' It has become
clear that legislation which merely regulates the labeling and application
of pesticides7 is not sufficient to protect the American people and their
environment. A regulatory pattern must be implemented that also limits
the extent of pesticide residue to which man is exposed. Up to the
present, the effectiveness of residue limitations has been greatly cur-
tailed, due to the "legally insufficient" certainty of detrimental results.,
Hopefully, hindsight will no longer continue to be our guide, and
reparation of the damage afterward our burden. The thought underlying
future legislation should be that we must stop treating the population
as guinea pigs and the environment as a laboratory. Regulation of
environmental contaminants offers a tangible and achievable opportun-
ity to practice preventive medicine9 through preventive legislation.
2. EXTENT OF PESTICIDE USE
In the mid-1940's, as one war had come to an end, another was
being initiated. 10 The new war was not against man, at least not inten-
tionally so. It was against insects, pathogens, and weed pests. Its princi-
pal weapons were not artillery or armies, but chemicals. Since then, this
chemical warfare has intensified. Today in the United States alone, over
1.2 billion pounds of synthetic pesticides are used annually" for the
6. Van Den Bosch, Insecticides and the Law, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 615 (1970).
7. "Labeling was the credo of control of the 1947 Federal Insecticide Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act and remains so today." ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 847
(1977).
8. Under traditional principles, the party bringing the suit against the producer
of a particular substance must produce factual evidence to show that the substance is
responsible for bringing about a specific harmful condition. See, e.g., Casenote, 25
CATH. U. L. REV. 178, 180 (1975) (emphasis added); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 581, 584 (comment on Scientific
Uncertainty and Environmental Threats to Human Health).
9. For an excellent essay assessing the role science plays in the regulation of
environmental contaminants, see E. Burger, supra note 2.
10. After World War II, the world experienced the widespread growth of the use
of pesticide chemicals. For a general discussion, see ROGERS, supra note 7, at 835.
11. For information concerning the extent of pesticide use, its successes and
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prevention of crop loss and the eradication of pestiferous organisms.
That amounts to six pounds of pesticides applied annually for every
man, woman, and child in this country."2 In an address to Congress in
1971, it was calculated that there would be a 13% annual increase in the
use of pesticides, and that by 1985 there would be a sixfold increase . 3
Recent estimates show there are over 1,400 active chemical ingredients
present in pesticides. Combined in various amounts and arrangements,
there are over 40,000 different pesticide products," each of which must
supposedly be individually tested for safety in order to be registered. 5
Alarmingly, once applied, the chemicals do not simply achieve their
purpose and then degrade or decompose. The pesticides retain their
chemical identity and continue to function for an extended period of
time." This trait of pesticides has given rise to the use of the common
failures, alternative methods of pest control, and the infeasibility of pesticide use in light
of the food and energy crisis, see Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, 22
BULLETIN OF THE ENTOMOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, 20-26 (1976), and Pimentel,
Bioenvironmental Control of Pests: A Research Assessment (July 9, 1974) (unpublished
work prepared for Dept. of Entomology and Section of Ecology and Systematics,
Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.).
12. Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra note 11, at 21 n.17.
13. These estimates were based on the amount of pesticides then employed in pest
control, 833 million pounds. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to Federal Insecticide
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), before the House Committee on Agriculture,
92d Cong., 1st SEss. (1971).
14. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 117.
15. Before a pesticide can be registered, the manufacturer must submit with the
application the results of various safety studies. However, the EPA can, at its discretion,
register a pesticide with chemicals similar to those of a pesticide already registered,
without requiring additional safety tests. Conditional registrations can also be granted,
pending the outcome of safety tests. These two procedures, by which a manufacturer
can legitimately avoid showing a particular pesticide's safety, seem to have reduced
greatly the effectiveness of the registration process.
A senate subcommittee staff recommended that safety-testing data on pesticides
should be done for each compound prior to registration. Theoretically, this is an ideal
proposition. The task may, however, under existing registration procedures, prove insur-
mountable. The estimates of the General Accounting Office in 1975 predicted that over
46,000 pesticides were to be registered. For a further breakdown of the workload, see
note 71 infra. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Federal Pesticide Registra-
tion Program: Is It Protecting the Public and the Environment Adequately from Pesti-
cide Hazards? (Dec. 4, 1975) [hereinafter cited as GAO Report]; [19771 8 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 350 on subcommittee recommendations. See generally ROGERS, supra note 7,
at 850, 856, 872; W. BUTLER, Federal Pesticide Law, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
1240 (ELI 1974), discussing conditional permits and experimental use.
16. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT
5
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descriptive term "persistent pesticide."" Two other common descriptive
terms used for pesticides are "subacute" and "general." Subacute
means that the toxicity of the pesticide causes adverse effects in an
organism only upon repeated exposure.'8 The pesticide is considered
general when its composition is such that it does not specifically attack
one pest.'"
The persistent attribute provides an economic advantage to the
farmer or other applicator because the pesticide retains its toxic effect
for a long time. Thus, once a sufficiently lethal dosage is applied to
eradicate the intended pest, continual application is unnecessary. The
subacute characteristic of a pesticide is beneficial because it is safer for
those who handle the pesticides in transportation or application. The
chemicals, not being as acute,"0 are not as potentially lethal to one who
accidentally comes in contact with the substance. Most pesticides also
have a general characteristic because it is financially favorable to the
manufacturer. A general pesticide can attack various pests, thus making
the development of innumerable different pesticides unnecessary. This
can be a substantial saving, considering that the cost of development
may be anywhere from $2.1 million to $4 million."
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVI-
RONMENTAL HEALTH (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mrak Commission Report].
17. Comment, 6 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 122 (1970) (discussion on the
persistence of pesticides).
18. GAO Report, supra note 15, at glossary.
19. Comment, supra note 17.
20. "Acute" is that property of a substance or a mixture of substances which
causes adverse effects in an organism through a single exposure. GAO Report, supra
note 15, at glossary.
There is no reliable system capable of reporting, collecting, collating, and dissemi-
nating accurate information on the status of pesticide poisonings today in the United
States. A recent EPA study, however, was conducted nationwide. From 1971 to 1973,
the study estimated, there were 8,248 hospital-admitted pesticide poisonings. Of that
figure only 28% (2,295) were occupationally related poisonings. Farmers and agricul-
tural workers accounted only for 36% (817) of that group. UNITED STATES ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL STUDY OF HOSPITAL ADMITTED PESTICIDE
POISONINGS at 4, 168, 169 (April 1976).
21. Rumker, Guest & Upholt, The Search for Safer More Selective and Less
Persistent Pesticides, 20 Bio Sci 1004 (1970); see also Duvall, Pesticides: The Problem
and the Solution, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 79 (1975).
Today the cost of producing a pesticide can run as high as $12 million and is heading
upward. One contributing factor is that the time between discovery of a new pesticide
and the time it gets to market can be more than eight years. BUSINESS WEEK, September
27, 1976, at 56.
_. o
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3. EFFECT OF RESIDUES
The beneficial aspects22 of pesticides are subverted to the extent
that they remain active and potentially poisonous to man. This danger-
ous situation arises, as previously indicated, because the chemicals uti-
lized in pesticides do not rapidly decompose. For instance, DDT, one
of the first and most commonly applied, takes two to five years to break
down.?
Man unwittingly ingests these pesticide residues. He consumes
them daily with his food, which has been sprayed in the field or in
storage.u Man can also absorb residues from the meats and dairy prod-
ucts that he eats.? Processed foods may be another source of residue
intake, since they are generally packed or stored in containers which are
treated to prevent loss to rodents and contamination.
Man is subjected to an arguably low amount of pesticide residue
per food product. 2 Nevertheless, United States Department of Agricul-
22. Just how beneficial pesticides have been is debatable. Some say that many of
the diseases seemingly eradicated by the synthetic chemicals would have been eliminated
by natural causes, e.g., better nutrition, improved health care, and good hygiene. See
R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1970). Also, the overall percentage of crop losses to pests
has been increasing. Post-harvest losses (13k) plus pre-harvest losses ( 5%) indicate
that pest populations are consuming and/or destroying nearly half the world's food
supply. Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra note 11.
For an opposite view praising DDT and other pesticides, see War on Pesticides,
DDT was Number One on the Casualty List, BARRON'S, November 10, 1975, at 3.
23. Bennett, Residues Permitted in Foods, 49 TEx. L. REV. 356, n.27 (1975).
24. Crops are in contact with pesticides or their residues all along their route from
seedlings in the field to products in a store. The soil that grows them and the water that
nurtures them contain chemical residues. The foodstuffs are sprayed in the fields, after
harvest in storage, and in the boxcars on their way to market, to prevent loss to rodents,
micro-organisms, and insects. Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra
note 11.
25. For example, the two pesticides Heptachlor and Chlordane are found in 73%
of all dairy products and 77% of all meats, fish, and poultry samples. 5 ENvIR. L. REP.
10,163 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Natick Paperboard Corp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir.
1975), holding that paper packaging material containing polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB) in excess of tolerance levels will in many instances be an "unsafe food additive"
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; see also Pimentel,
World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra note 11.
27. EPA determines the acceptable daily intake for residues of each pesticide
which may be present in or on agricultural commodities. Acceptable daily intake for
man is usually one per cent of the pesticide concentration which was found to have no
toxic effect in the most sensitive animal species tested. Total possible exposure to
7
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ture (USDA) figures show that the average American consumes 1,435
pounds of food annually. 8 Although the food is readily broken down,
the pesticide chemicals contained therein are not. Virtually every person
in the United States has residues of pesticides in his body tissue. 9 The
potential harm posed to man from such continued exposure to low levels
of pesticides is presently being debated .3  Exposure at these levels,
however, has been proven to be toxic to other species.3t In laboratory
tests it has been shown that 0.1 parts per billion in seawater of the
pesticide Mirex, which is used to control the fire ant in the southeastern
United States, had a lethal effect on crabs, and killed 11% of the shrimp
population in ten days and 50% after three weeks of exposure.2 The
potentially poisonous effect may be more startling and ominous in
human consumption of pesticide residues.
pesticide residue is computed in the average diet of a 132-pound man. However, as will
be shown below, the safety tests upon which the tolerances are set are of dubious validity
and the FDA, whose duty it is to monitor the foodstuffs for pesticide residue, only test
for the presence of about 90 of the 230 residues in food for which tolerances have been
set. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 38-44.
28. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL STATISTIcs at 562 (1974).
29. Mrak Commission Report, supra note 16.
30. "Scientists are concerned that so little is known about the ecological effects
of pesticides on the plants and animals (200,000 species) making up man's life system.
Information on the effect of pesticides is available for less than 1% of these species, and
at best most of this information is incomplete." Pimentel, Bioenvironmental Control
of Pests: A Research Assessment, supra note 11, at 14.
Since so little is known, most debates center on" the question of whether "the facts
must come first, and social judgments later," or whether to allow the marketing of a
pesticide, whose effects are unknown, based upon the possibility and seriousness of the
threatened harm. The latter argument seems to have support because of the underlying
premise that man can resolve (eventually) any problem he has created.
Such illusions are antiquated. Recently, we have realized that our resources are
finite and that they must be conserved and utilized rationally. As David Pimentel
indicated, large quantities of fossil fuel energy is used in controlling pests. Most pesti-
cides are formulated with a petroleum base and their development and application
expend great quantities of fuel. Also, many other activities necessary to our system of
food production consume enormous amounts of fuel. If the present world population
ate a diet derived from a food production system equivalent to that of the United States,
petroleum reserves would be exhausted in thirteen years.
See also Comment, 21 S.D. L. REv. 425, 427-28 (1976). (Debate between Prof.
Green and Dr. Handler on which approach is better: to restrict production until facts
are known, or to allow production so that facts can be gathered which will form the
basis of subsequent social judgments.)
3 1. Duvall, supra note 21, at 82.
32. H. WELLFORD, SOWING THE WIND 297 (1972).
I
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Man is at the top of the food chain,3 at each step of which the
pesticide residue is stored and the chemical concentration increasesY
This process, known as biomagnification, continues until it reaches man
at the top. In addition, the effects of pesticides are sometimes magnified
by interaction with other chemicals or drugs, resulting at times in syner-
gistic effects.'- This occurs when the co-operative action of separate
substances produces a total effect much greater than the sum of the
effects of the two compounds acting independently. The opportunity for
synergistic interaction is apparently greater today, with the ever-
increasing amount of chemicals that the American public consumes,
either in the form of food additives or by means of "medical drug
intoxication.""6
4. HISTORY OF REGULATION
The Food and Drug Act of 1906 3 was the forerunner of statutory
33. That is to say, he is at the top of the sequence in which each organism in the
chain feeds on the member below it. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ECOL-
OGICAL EFFECrS OF PESTICIDES ON NON-TARGET SPECIES (1971). For example, pesti-
cide residues can enter the waterway from industrial waste, agricultural runoff, direct
application to control mosquitoes, and the like. Once in the aquatic environment, the
residues will settle to the bottom. There they will be picked up by algae, plankton, and
water bottom plants. In time, these organisms will be eaten by shrimp, shell fish, and
small fish. At this point (or after the smaller water life have been consumed by a species
higher in the chain, e.g., larger fish" man, at the top of the chain, will consume the
pesticide residue contained in the % ater organism which he ate. Only by now, the
chemical concentration will have been increased by every organism through which it
passed. C. EDWARDS, PERSISTENT PESTICIDES IN THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1973).
34. Duvall, supra note 21 at 79, 80.
35. Williams, DRUGS-PESTICIDE INTERACTION, FDA PAPERS 14 (1969).
36. This comment on the American infatuation with the "Almighty Curative
Chemical" reflects a critical analysis by many observers. The American public today
consumes more drugs than ever before, most of which are taken unnecessarily and
merely as a result of profit-seeking advertisement. For example: Headache?-take the
little white aspirin; Hangover?-the bubbly pill will make it vanish! Fat?-some diet food
or pills (amphetamines) will get you back in shape. Skinny?-steroids will beef you up.
No wonder the American people are hesitant and unsupportive in the fight against
the existence of chemical residues in their food. This is a drug-oriented society with a
fervent faith in the politically powerful chemical and drug companies. Miami Herald,
Sept. 15, 1977, Br. Sec. at 2.
37. Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 repealed by Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act c. 675 § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-392 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). See also Birmingham & Kyl, Legal & Practical Aspects of Pesticide Spray
Cases, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 585, 592 (1970).
12:1978 101[1
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authority for control of pesticide residues in food. Stronger statutes
ensued: the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938,1s
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 9
in 1947. Many amendments accompanied FIFRA, most importantly
the Miller Pesticide Chemical Amendment in 1954, the 1959 amend-
ment, and the 1964 amendment. 0
Originally, FIFRA was designed to provide for safety and product
quality through labeling and registration. It called for the registration
of all pesticides with the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). The FDCA, administered by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW), complemented FIFRA in protecting the
public from food contamination by pesticides.41 Its civil and criminal
sanctions, however, were operative only if an "adulterated" food was
introduced into interstate commerce bearing a level of pesticide residue
exceeding HEW's established tolerance.42
In the 1960's, as national concern grew about the effects of pollu-
tion and the extent of "uninvited additives" present in food, environ-
mental groups attempted to use FIFRA to prevent the indiscriminate
application of pesticides. Their efforts in a series of court cases were
38. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-392 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
39. C. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat. 190
(1964), 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970) (prior to 1972 Amendments) [hereinafter cited as FIFRAI.
This Act repealed and replaced the Insecticide Act of 1910, which essentially was a
labeling measure covering all insecticides and fungicides. C. 125,61 Stat. 163 (1947)
(repealing Insecticide Act of 1910, c. 191, 36 Stat. 331).
40. The 1954 Amendment gave the administrator of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration the power to establish tolerance limits for pesticide residues on raw agricultural
commodities and processed foods. H. A. TOULMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
FOODS, DRUGS AND COSMETICS § 19.6 at 396 (1963). The 1959 amendment brought
defoliants and other newly developed pesticides under the regimes of FIFRA. Id. § 19.7
at 397. The 1964 amendment laid the foundation for today's registration process, by
trying to restrict marketability prior to registration. 100 CONG. REC. 2948 (1964). See
generally Comment, supra note 17.
41. See Bennett, supra note 23, for an explanation of how the administrator of
the FDA set the tolerances while the registration of the pesticide was under the control
of the USDA. Both departments split the monitoring of foods for excess residues duties.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1970 & Supp. 1975. The term "adulterated" applies to a
food or pesticide containing chemicals or substances inconsistent with the tolerance
levels prescribed by law. The definition can be found under the FEPCA, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(C) (1976).
43. For a description of pesticide residues existing in our food supply, see Rogers,
The Persistent Problem of Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 567, 595 (1970).
1102 2:1978 1
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futile.41 The inadequacy of FIFRA's narrow scope was exemplified by
those decisions. The Act was impotent because (1) it failed to meet its
original product safety purposes, i.e., the setting of tolerances; (2) it
could not enforce its provisions; and (3) it did not provide for monitor-
ing of food residues. 4
Overlap of agency control also caused the Act's failure to meet its
original product safety purposes. HEW was to base its decision, whether
to grant a tolerance of a pesticide, upon safety. 6 However, USDA had
the initial determination of whether to register a pesticide, and based
its decision on other considerations. Thus, if HEW found the residue
of a certain pesticide to be unsafe, it could not effectively prohibit its
use if the USDA continued to allow its registration. Such an occurrence
44. Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 461 F.2d 293
(7th Cir. 1972). The court rejected the Environmental Protection Agency's attempt to
cancel the manufacturer's registration of a rodenticide. The court held that the agency
had overstepped its authority in attempting to apply the "intricate balancing test" in
this instance. FIFRA is basically a labeling act, the court continued, and a registration
can be cancelled only if the product is misbranded. It is inappropriate, however, to
determine that a product is misbranded when it is being used in accordance with com-
monly recognized practices.
Continental Chemist Corp. v. Ruckleshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972). The court
said the basic purpose of FIFRA is to regulate the labeling of poisons. The fact that
the use of the poison in compliance with the directiqns on its label would cause certain
food to become "adulterated" within the meaning of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
does not mean that the poison was necessarily misbranded, within the meaning of
FIFRA. Thus, the manufacturer's registration, the court held, could not properly be
cancelled. See also Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (administra-
tive process must be concluded to properly suspend registration of a herbicide).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The EDF petitioned for review of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture which failed
to suspend federal registration of a pesticide or to commence formal administrative
procedures that could terminate that registration. The court favorably remanded the
case for further proceedings. The court held that it would require the administrators to
articulate the factors on which they based their decisions, but noted that on matters of
substance the courts regularly would uphold agency decisions.
45. See W. BUTLER, supra note 15, where the author discusses the problems
created by agency overlap and designates these areas as critical.
46. Safety was based upon the consideration of three factors: "the nation's need
for food; effects of the pesticide on the consumer; and the USDA's opinion concerning
the pesticide's usefulness." Bennett, supra note 23, at 359.
47. The determination was to be based upon agricultural usefulness and probable
residue levels involved in the establishment of tolerances. SEN. REP. No. 1635, 83d
CONG., 2d SEss. (June 25, 1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2626, 2629.
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was not uncommon. 8
Also, the USDA failed to enforce adequately the provisions of
FIFRA. Such inadequacy was noted in a report to Congress in 1971.
"[Tihe Department not only failed to initiate a single criminal prosecu-
tion for 13 years despite evidence of repeated violations, but . . . it did
not even have any procedure for determining the basis for action."49
Finally, its powers to monitor were also virtually ineffective. The
Department of Agriculture relied heavily on inadequate and incomplete
data to determine if the pesticide should initially be registered."0 Also,
a great deal of information regarding the toxicity or other characteris-
tics of a pesticide was supplied by manufacturers, who had a substantial
investment in the pesticide51 and a vested interest in securing a speedy
registration 2.5 A monitoring plan utilizing only such biased information
would assuredly not lead to the cancellation or suspension of a pesticide.
If the USDA administrator determined that the weight of evidence
supported the cancellation or seizure of a hazardous pesticide, his action
would be reviewable by the courts. However, this system of court review
before a pesticide could be taken off the market was a sham, because
the procedural process could delay any affirmative action up to 390
days." Apparently, the agencies were still at the mercy of the manufac-
turers and had to rely largely on voluntary recalls. 4
To patch these gaping holes in FIFRA, Congress responded in 1970
by approving the President's Reorganization Plan, which expanded the
government's environmental concerns and consolidated fifteen federal
organizations under the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).5 5 This consolidation of power would have been fruitless had it
48. Rogers, supra note 43, at 570. See also 117 CONG. REc. 2009-10 (introduction
of the National Pesticide Control and Protection Act).
49. Id. at 2010.
50. Id.
51. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1277.
52. Comment, The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972: A
Compromise Approach, 3 ECOL. L. QUARTERLY 277 (1973).
53. 117 CONG. REC., supra note 48.
54. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1237.
55. The primary transfer of power shifted to the administrator of the EPA the
functions vested in the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for establishing
tolerances for pesticide chemicals, REORG. PLAN No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-
1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
See Comment, supra note 52 and Rogers, supra note 43, discussing effects and implica-
tions of the reorganization plan on the regulation of pesticides.
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not been accompanied by significant improvement of the law. The con-
gressional response to criticism of FIFRA by courts, legal commenta-
tors, and environmental groups was the Federal Environmental Pesti-
cide Control Act (FEPCA),56 which completely overhauled the federal
environmental authority.57 An in-depth study of the Act is not within
the scope of this report. Some of its more important aspects, however,
deserve mentioning.
Under the FEPCA, regulation of pesticides will no longer be re-
stricted to those involved in interstate shipment, but will include all
aspects of transfer, solicitation, and sales even if totally intrastate." The
FEPCA also expands the previous registration procedure. By employing
a system of use control, it cures one of the major deficiencies of FIFRA.
The use, either "general" or "restricted," is determined by demonstrat-
ing whether the pesticide, when applied according to its labeling instruc-
tions, will cause an unreasonable effect on man or the environment.59 If
affirmatively determined that the pesticide will cause substantial ad-
verse effects on the environment, it will be classified for restrictive use.
As of October 1977, 23 pesticides had been classified for restrictive use
and 38 more were being considered. Such categorization of a pesticide
requires that it be applied only by those competent to handle such
materials and restricted by other limitations as determined by the ad-
ministrator of the EPA."0
The major advancement in the pesticide registration process
brought about by FEPCA is the provision stating that any pesticide
56. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516,
86 Stat. 973 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as FEPCA].
57. 40 Fed. Reg. 28, 242 (1975).
58. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1976), states in pertinent part: "[N]o person in any State
may distribute, sell, offer for sale, hold for sale, ship, deliver for shipment, or receive
and (having so received) deliver or offer to deliver, to any person any pesticide which is
not registered with the Administrator."
59. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(B) (1976) states:
If the Administrator determines that the pesticide, when applied in accordance
with its directions for use, warnings and cautions and for the uses for which it is
registered, or for one or more of such uses, or in accordance with a widespread
and commonly recognized practice, will not generally cause unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment, he will classify the pesticide, or the particular use or
uses of the pesticide to which the determination applies, for general use.
The FEPCA defines unreasonable adverse effects as "any unreasonable risk to man or
the environment, taking into account the economic, social and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide." 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1976).
60. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1976); 3 EPA JOURNAL 3 (1977).
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which fails to meet certain criteria will be subject to a "rebuttable
presumption" against registration."' This provision also applies to pesti-
cides that are already on the market, since the Act requires that all
pesticides registered with the EPA before the 1972 amendment be rere-
gistered before October 21, 1976.62 After that date, all pesticides must
be reregistered every five years.
The reregistration procedure may tactically be used as an alterna-
tive to cancellation or suspension, as a means of removing a pesticide
from the market. Instead of becoming entangled with the expensive and
unchanged lengthy cancellation process, the EPA will allow the pesti-
cide to be used up until the time reregistration is required. Then the
application for reregistration will be denied, based upon the rebuttable
presumption that the pesticide will cause adverse effects on the environ-
ment. This "phase out" of a pesticide is currently being used against
Mirex.13 It succeeds not only in saving money and time, but also shifts
61. 6 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,087 (1976). A notice of intent to deny registration or
cancel an existing registration will be issued by the EPA if the applicant fails to prove
the safety of his product. The presumption of unacceptability is based upon risk. How-
ever, even if the chemical's use gives rise to a presumption of risk, this presumption can
be rebutted by showing the pesticide's economic, social, and environmental benefits. 40
CFR § 162.11 (1977).
Note that, although this is a patently strong provision, it is doubtful if its applica-
tion can be effective in eliminating from the market a pesticide with hazardous effects.
Manufacturers can avoid the ramifications of this provision and refute contentions of a
pesticide's possible safety risks by producing evidence of attainable economic costs and
benefits.
This provision still does not rectify the problem that has plagued EPA's analysis
of information submitted in support of registration of a pesticide. Adequate review of
safety tests data continues to be difficult because (I) EPA lacks its own scientific
research and evaluating knowledge and (2) private environmentally interested groups
are of no assistance, since the data supporting the registration are not published in the
Federal Register until 30 days after the product is registered. Compounding this flaw is
the fact that a good portion of the data is not published. Trade secret protection is
allotted to that test data which the originator of the product claims. Under this provi-
sion, health and safety data are often excluded from the published information. See
ROGERS, supra note 7, at 861, 862; [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 280; E. Burger, supra
note 2.
62. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1976). All FEPCA provisions were to be effective by
October 21, 1976. This meant that all pesticides were to be registered according to its
provisions, including presently active pesticides. As will be shown later, this task proved
to be impossible. 41 FED. REG. 7218 (1976).
63. See [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 849.
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the burden on the pesticide manufacturer to prove the safety of his
product.64
5. CONTINUING PROBLEMS
Theoretically, under the FEPCA, the residues from pesticides in
our foods will be restricted to limited and safe levels. The registration
process requires the manufacturer to provide the EPA with safety stud-
ies on the active ingredients in each type of pesticide. The EPA then
reviews the studies to ensure the pesticide's safety and effectiveness.
Based upon the studies submitted, the EPA establishes tolerances for
the maximum pesticide residue concentration allowed in a food product.
The monitoring of the residues in food for violations of the tolerances
is done via the food inspection functions of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), and by the meat and poultry inspection and chemical
monitoring services of the USDA. 5 If a violation of a tolerance level is
detected, then appropriate regulatory" action will be initiated. If the
administrator of the EPA determines it necessary, he may notify the
registrant of his intentions to cancel or suspend the registration of the
pesticide or change its classification. 7
The above system, however, does not operate as successfully, rou-
tinely, or effectively in practice as it hypothetically was proposed. The
FEPCA has apparently filled the gaping holes of previous legislation.
Unfortunately, crevices still exist which permit persistent pesticides to
continue to seep into our environment and food supply. The EPA real-
ized its deficiencies in the review of tolerance regulations and procedures
in 1975, but said that it would devote its attention to reassessing the
existing tolerances and making a comprehensive evaluation of the whole
scientific basis for tolerance setting. 6 Good intentions, however, do not
make good regulations. A Senate subcommittee staff report released
64. Id. For a discussion of the effects of Mirex, see H. WELLFORD, supra note
32, at 296, 297.
65. Id. at 354.
66. The EPA can initiate cancellation or suspension hearings of the pesticide or,
if necessary to prevent further contamination, it can issue a "stop sale, use or removal
order" to any person who owns, controls, or has custody of such pesticide. 7 U.S.C. §
136k (1976). The Food and Drug Administration can remove the adulterated foodstuff
from the market under the authority of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C.
§ 331 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
67. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136d(b) & (c) (1970) [before 1972 amendments].
68. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 49.
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two years later in 1977 came to the "unfortunate conclusion that pesti-
cide regulation in the U.S. is still fundamentally deficient." 9
The foundation of such criticism lies in the basis of pesticide regula-
tion-the registration process. The FEPCA, enacted in 1972, required
the EPA to register all pesticides during the two-year period ending
October 1976.10 That called for, in addition to the normal workload,7'
the registering of 46,000 pesticides. To magnify the enormity of the
project, EPA failed to have the proposed guidelines for registering and
classifying pesticides ready for public viewing until June 25, 1975.72
Since registrants needed such information to know what was necessary
to support their registration, and the FEPCA registration program
could not start without such regulations, "the EPA lost about nine
months of the 2-year period provided by the Act.' 73 The problem still
exists. An EPA official told a Senate subcommittee in March 1977 that
"the registration of pesticides could take as long as 15 years. 74
This excessive workload has given rise to other problems. The
comprehensive evaluation of the scientific basis for tolerance-setting
may once again be shoved to the rear of the workload. Time and re-
sources are limited, so the EPA must make a policy decision of whether
to proceed with the registration process as quickly as possible, and
accordingly sacrifice the integrity of the data submitted by a manufac-
69. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
prepared a report on the EPA, a summary of which can be found in [77] 7 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 1284-86.
70. See text accompanying note 62, supra.
71. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 67. The report also stated: "In addition to
the 46,000 FEPCA registrations, EPA's projected workload during the 2 year period
include[d] 13,000 . . .new pesticide registration applications and 14,000 [applications
for amended registrations as to product formulation, uses labeling, etc.]. Id. The 46,000
figure represented 29,000 currently registered pesticides that [had to be] reregistered and
17,000 intrastate pesticides . . . not previously required to be registered. . . ." Id.
72. Id. at 68 (40 FED. REG. 26,801-928. The final proposals were not published
until July 3, 1975 (40 FED. REG. 28,241-86 and did not become effective until August
4, 1975.
73. Id. at 69. The two-year period specified by the FEPCA was from October 22,
1974 to October 21, 1976. The lapse between the passage of the Act in 1972 and the
time the registration period was to begin allowed ample time for the EPA to devise some
standards of safety and risk benefit, to which the registrants could conform. They did
not, however, do so.
74. Assistant Administrator for Water and Hazardous Materials Andrew W.
Brienenback noted: "In no case could the process take less than five years." [77] 7
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1742.
I
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turer in support of registration.75 Such sacrifice is questionable in light
of past experiences by the EPA with the safety data submitted by regis-
trants. A General Accounting Office study in 1975 showed that many
manufacturers failed even to submit safety studies on active pesticide
ingredients." The reliability of many of those submitted was question-
able. EPA Deputy Administrator John R. Quarles noted "that in vir-
tually every instance, independent pathologists77 diagnosed many more
cancerous and pre-cancerous tumors in test animals than did the origi-
nal laboratory pathologists. ' 7 Reliance by the EPA on the safety data
for registration qualification and tolerance-setting by those who have a
"vested interest" in having the pesticide registered is without substantial
foundation. Concealment of certain hazardous attributes have been
made without prosecution for violation of the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act.79
75. [1977] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1286. Note that the former EPA Administrator
cancelled the reregistration program in August of 1976 pending resolution of the data
validity issue.
A year later, the problem of laboratory test deficiencies still exists. However, the
agency recently has requested 31 pesticide manufacturers and two federal agencies
(FDA and USDA) to review and certify the accuracy of tests conducted by a suspect
independent laboratory. If review uncovers "serious human health or environmental
hazards," then evidence of faulty testing will be handed over to the Department of
Justice for appropriate action. This could lead to the first civil or criminal penalties
assessed against a testing laboratory under FIFRA. [77] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 585. See
also [771 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 644.
76. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 7-11. The requirements of safety data have
been becoming more and more stringent on the active ingredients. The GAO report,
however, shows that compliance has not been on a reciprocal increase. The two most
recent testing requirements for teratogenicity, 1970 (to determine if exposure to the
chemical will cause birth defects), and mutagenicity, 1972 (to determine if exposure will
cause permanent genetic change), have been generally ignored. Safety data were missing
for the 36 active chemicals present in the 100 sample pesticides chosen for the GAO
study, in 14 instances (39%)" for teratogenicity and 23 instances (64%) for mutagenicity.
77. A pathologist is someone in the branch of medicine who studies the nature of
the structural and functional changes caused by disease, and the conditions and pro-
cesses that result in disease. See J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
at 38 (1975).
78. A comment made when seeking a criminal investigation of the Veliscol Chem-
ical Corporation of Chicago. The firm was suspected of withholding data of possible
cancer-causing properties of the pesticides, Heptachlor and Chlordane. PREVENTION-
THE MAGAZINE FOR BETTER HEALTH, May 1976, at 202 [hereinafter referred to as
PREVENTION).
79. W. BUTLER, supra note 45, at 1267-68.
Experience has shown that because of the paucity of EPA enforcement personnel
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In light of the Act, the motive for such an incomplete presentation
by the manufacturer is obvious. Under the FEPCA, the biggest burden
on the pesticide manufacturer is getting his product registered. Once
that is accomplished, the pesticide is permitted to be used. It then is
relatively safe from being removed from the market. The cancellation
procedure is still a seemingly endless and almost non-existent process.80
The possibility of suspension is also slight, since the EPA must resort
to "courtroom" proof that the pesticide presents a risk to man or the
environment.81 Moreover, even if a cancellation or suspension enforce-
and the low priority which the Justice Department gives to even criminal viola-
tions of the pesticide laws, violations, when uncovered, provoke nothing more
than a slap on the wrist, a warning to go and sin no more, and a minor fine.
Id. There are also legal ways to conceal. The agency requires animal tests in the safety
studies for registration. The registrant is given the choice of which two species to use in
the experiments. The law's requirement for animal testing may be fulfilled if the manu-
facturer, as is frequently done, chooses the species which has been found to be the most
resistant to the substance at issue. The validity of the chemical's "safe" characteristic
is only a partial truth. Id. at 1277. EPA's reporting requirements are less stringent for
inert ingredients than they are for active ingredients, and non-existent for synergistic
effects, i.e., toxic effects caused by chemicals in combination which are greater than
the effects of the individual chemicals acting independently. GAO Report, supra note
15, at 6, 12. In addition, the present system allows the granting of conditional registra-
tions, which "permit exposure of the public to occur and user reliance to develop before
the safety of the product has been established." Extension of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Re-
search and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1977) (statement of Maureen Hinkle, pesticides
monitor, Environmental Defense Fund), reprinted in [1977] 8 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 281.
80. In the CBS broadcast, "The Politics of Cancer," reporter Lesley Stahl inter-
viewed three senior EPA lawyers who resigned in February 1976. Their resignation was
to protest the EPA's inaction under its existing authority to control toxic chemicals. For
quite some time, the EPA had a list of over 100 suspected carcinogenic pesticides and
no action was taken. Even if action were taken, the process is "very long."
Frank Sizemore, one of the three attorneys who resigned, said: "The conservative
estimate is that if a chemical goes into that procedure [referring not to the process to
take the pesticide off the market, but merely the procedure before the administrator is
allowed to decide whether he wants to do something] it won't come out until 12 or 18
months later, and then we start a big hearing." CBS REPORTS, "The Politics of Can-
cer," as broadcast over the CBS Television Network, pp. 2, 13 of transcript (June 22,
1976).
81. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d
1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973), stating: "[Tlhe order of the Administrator cancelling
registrations must be based on substantial evidence of record developed at a hearing if
a public hearing is held, and the order must set forth detailed findings of fact." See
[1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. 586, where an EPA Office of General Counsel attorney noted that
1 10
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ment procedure is undertaken, some comfort is still provided for the
powerful pesticide manufacturer. A conciliatory and undermining
"indemnity provision""2 was included in the final version of the FEPCA
to facilitate its acceptance.3 It provides that if a pesticide is not found
to be unsafe upon registration, but is subsequently discovered to have
hazardous effects, then the manufacturer is to be reimbursed. Ironically,
the reimbursement is to come from the public, whom the manufacturer
has endangered.
There are other flaws in the FEPCA regulatory scheme. For exam-
ple, no provision exists for environmentalists or consumers to bring suit
to challenge the refusal, granting, or cancellation of a pesticide's regis-
tration, although provisions were present in earlier drafts of the Act.Y
In the recent past, citizen participation has been encouraged by the
EPA." Such a vital element as an interested party86 should not be in-
cluded or excluded from a registration hearing at the whim of the ad-
ministrator.
Administrative agency overlap, which impedes the implementation
of action, still exists. When the EPA was formed in 1970, only a partial
transfer of the pesticide regulation function was effectuated." The entire
registration process was assumed from the USDA, but portions of the
"EPA would have to meet a stringent imminent hazard standard to suspend registra-
tion."
82. 7 U.S.C. § 136 m (1976). The provision allows not only the manufacturer, but
anyone who owns a portion of the pesticide at the time it is suspended or cancelled to
be reimbursed for its costs by the EPA. One author notes that the indemnity provision
does not apply where it can be shown that those claimants caught with quantities of
the pesticide had prior knowledge of its hazards or had some reasonable way of attaining
such knowledge. Even then, the exclusion depends upon whether the EPA bears its
burden of proving the manufacturer's knowledge. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1260,
1261.
83. Comment, supra note 52, at 308-9.
84. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1287.
85. Id. "EPA has encouraged citizen participation in the implementation of
FEPCA, as provided by § 21(b) of the Act, especially by inviting comment upon imple-
menting regulation." Id.
86. Surely citizens concerned with leading a healthy and safe existence have an
interest in proceedings (administrative as well as judicial) whose outcome will determine
if a pesticide, with potential detrimental environmental effects, will be permitted to be
produced and applied. See Casenote, 52 J. URB. L. 609 (1974) (discussing Pinkney v.
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (no funda-
mental right to a healthful environment)).
87. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1274.
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responsibility for setting tolerances of residues in food were left with the
FDA." Also, the entire program for the monitoring of residues of pesti-
cides was scattered among several different agencies, 9 with the FDA
and USDA primarily handling the monitoring function for foods.
This division of authority created co-ordination problems. The
FDA and EPA have attempted to alleviate some of them by reaching
an inter-agency agreement to exchange all information and investigative
reports.10 Similar co-operation with the USDA has not blossomed. To
the contrary, the USDA has been at times more a hindrance than a
help.9 Perhaps such lack of co-operation emanates from the loss of
pesticide regulation to the EPA, or, as many have commented, from the
fact that USDA's principal obligation is the protection of agricultural
business.g9
6. A NEW APPROACH
A current crisis exists in pesticide regulation. The inadequate evalu-
ation of safety testing data for registration results practically in the
invalidation of the tolerance-setting program. The consequence of
falsely-based tolerances is the inundation of the market with pesticides
that are dangerous to health and the environment. Congress blames the
EPA for poor planning and management.9 3 The EPA seeks exoneration
by citing the lack of resources, time constraints, and the enormity of the
task.94 Regardless of how this political problem of regulation is resolved,
88. The Environmental Protection Agency sets tolerances for (1) pesticide resi-
dues on raw agricultural commodities; (2) residues carried over into processed foods
from raw agricultural commodities; (3) residues resulting from direct treatment of
processed foods and from exposure during treatment and preparation in food-handling
establishments; and (4) residues attributable to certain types of packaging. The Food
and Drug Administration continues to set pesticide food tolerance for residues resulting
from the use of sanitizers on food-contact surfaces, from the use of pesticides as preser-
vatives in processed food, and from certain types of food packaging not regulated by
EPA. Id. citing 36 FED. REG. 24, 234 (1971); 38 FED. REG. 21,685 (1973); 38 FED. REG.
24,233 (1973).
89. Id. at 1275, 1276.
90. 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,136 (1975).
91. One example has been a concerted effort unsuccessfully spearheaded by the
USDA to regain pesticide control from EPA jurisdiction, after that agency had banned
Chlordane and Heptachlor. PREVENTION, May 1976, at 202.
92. Comment, supra note 17, at 136.
93. [77] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1284, 1285.
94. Id. at 1286.
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the burden of inadequate protection from pesticide hazards ultimately
falls on the public and the environment.
It is apparent that regulation is not keeping pace with scientific
development and thus is not achieving the goals intended for environ-
mental legislation.15 The greatest impediment to successful regulation
appears to be the regulations themselves! The EPA is strangling in its
own red tape. It needs help in the form of stronger legislation which
abandons the traditional legalistic approach. Regulations based upon
legal concepts of cause and proof in the context of environmental pro-
tection are inappropriate and inefficient. A "substantial adverse effect
on man or the environment""6 must be shown "likely to occur"97 before
strict enforcement practices can be implemented to prevent further con-
tamination by the hazardous substance. Pressure has already been ap-
plied to modify the standards of proof and methods of review applied
by the courts in public health hazard litigation." It seems anomalous,
95. The purpose of environmental legislation is:
(1) [to] fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
(2) [to] assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) [to] attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences ...
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(l)-(3) (1970).
96. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (bb) (1976). See supra note 59 (definition of unreasonable
adverse effects).
97. In the case of Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir. 1975), an action was brought seeking a permanent injunction.
This action was brought against Reserve to abate the industrial discharge of asbestos
fibers into the waters of Lake Superior and the emission of the fibers into the ambient
air.
At issue were the long-term effects of low level exposure to asbestos fibers. The
effects of such exposure, like the harm of pesticide residue consumption, have not been
conclusively established by scientific proof. The court concluded that it could not be said
that "the probability of harm is more likely than not." Reserve was granted a
"reasonable time" for abatement despite claims by the EPA that any delay could
endanger the surrounding community. Thus, as other commentators have noted, the
burden on the environmental litigant remains a proof that the risk of harm is "more
likely than not" to occur. See generally Comment, supra note 30; Comment, UTAH L.
REV. 58 (1975); Casenote, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 178 (1975).
98. For discussion of proposed legislation after the Reserve Mining decision, see
Note, 59 MINN. L. REV. 893, 923 n. 138 (1975) discussing S. 841, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 3 (1975), a bill to make the risk-benefit approach applicable to all environmental suits.
Especially instigating the legislative response was the court's decision to resolve "all
uncertainties . . . in favor of health safety." This was a "legislative policy judgment
12:1978 113 1
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though, to wait until the litigation stage to enjoin the use of a pesticide.
Legislation requiring the manufacturer to prove that his substance will
not have a detrimental effect on man and the environment could prevent
a dangerous pesticide from ever being used. At the present time, preven-
tion of the use of hazardous pesticides cannot be successful, owing to
(1) the limited tests now required of a pesticide's safety and (2) the rigid
standard of proof required by courts in reviewing agency decisions on
the safety of a product.
These problems can be resolved by drafting legislation which (1)
includes requirements of extensive testing, as recommended by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office99 and (2) concomitantly provides for the adop-
tion of the scientific concept of proof to determine the pesticide's safety.
The former provision would require tests on every individual pesticide
product, not merely on the product's active ingredients. Also, informa-
tion would have to be supplied on the product's inert ingredients and
mutagenic effects.100 The latter provision calling for the use of a scien-
tific approach in restricting environmental contaminants would allow
the EPA, in reviewing a pesticide application for registration, to require
nearly "scientific proof" that the manufacturer's product is safe.'0 This
approach, which would limit the exposure of the environment to sub-
stances the effects of which were unascertainable by present technology,
could be characterized as an "absolutist stance against uncertainty."
This stance would prevent a pesticide from being produced or applied
if its safety test results did not meet "the conditions for valid scientific
predictive inferences"'0 2 that the product's use would be safe.
not a judicial one." Hearing on S. 1104 Amend. 1814 Before the Subcomm. on the
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1974). See
Comment, 60 IowA L. REV. 299, 312 (1974). The author dicusses S. 3723, The Resource
Conservation & Energy Recovery Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), which was
proposed to clarify congressional intent in the area of health safety. The proposal
apparently favored an ex parte proceeding in decisions to eliminate a hazard. The
administrator would only have to make a prima facie showing of a hazardous condition
to obtain an injunction, which could not be rebutted until trial.
99. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 6.
100. An active ingredient in a pesticide is one which will:
(I) prevent, destroy, repel, attract or mitigate any pest,
(2) regulate the growth of a plant,
(3) cause foliage to fall from the plant (defoliant),
(4) artificially accelerate the drying of plant tissue (dessicant).
Id. at glossary.
101. See Comment, supra note 3.
102. Such terminology is used to describe the level of criteria that would substan-
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The use of such a stringent standard as scientific certainty would
also be beneficial when the agency's decision to cancel, suspend, or deny
registration of a pesticide is subjected to court review. Fewer decisions
would undergo unresolvable scientific debate in the courtroom because
the agency's decisions would be based on more definite data. With
judicial review limited to a determination of whether the manufacturer
proved the safety of his product by more than a mere preponderance of
the evidence, it seems likely that fewer agency decisions would be over-
turned.
In banning a pesticide, strong scientifically-based legislative action
will prove more effective than the risk-benefit analysis presently used
by the courts' in reviewing whether a chemical substance poses an
adverse effect to man and his environment. Professor Owen Olpin
summed up the reasons why the risk-benefit test is less than acceptable:
First, available knowledge is often inadequate to permit a meaning-
ful balancing of benefits and costs, since the costs are often unknown and
incapable of measurement. Second, the balancing often requires the com-
parison of incomparables, and raises serious ethical questions, such as
those arising from weighing the value of production of certain items for
human convenience and monetary gain against serious risks of human
death and injury."4
Indeed, the choices available with a balancing test are not rational
ones. First, although the expenses of research, development, and lost
profits can be evaluated, what value should be assignable to a healthy
human existence? In a recent hijacking of a Japanese airplane, the
Japanese government paid $6 million for release of the hostages." 5 Life
should not be of any less value to Americans. Chemicals on the market
should not be cloaked in the same presumption of innocence as people;
they should not be presumed innocent until proven guilty.'
Second, a court that uses the risk-benefit test while weighing the
value of a suspect chemical is not as qualified as an administrative
tiate a scientist's prognostication of an event from the given evidence. See Gelpe &
Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decision Making, 48 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 371, 374 (1974).
103. For discussion of the development and use of the risk-benefit analysis, see
Comment, 1975 UTAH L. REV., supra note 97; see also Casenote, supra note 97.
104. Olpin, Policing Toxic Chemicals, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 85, 89.
105. Miami Herald, October 4, 1977 § A at 2.
106. CBS, supra note 80, at 3. See also Casenote, supra note 97, at 180.
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agency to consider the risks posed or the available alternatives that are
equally, if not more, effective." 7 In this area, a Washington newspaper
report indicated that human death and injury are present risks, which
the now utilized legalistic methodology of enforcement has failed to
curb.
Ominous recent reports of a sharp increase in the cancer rate in 1975
tend to support those who say that we are now seeing the start of a cancer
epidemic caused in part by massive use of synthetic chemical pesticides
since World War 11.108
Dr. Samuel S. Epstein, an environmental toxicologist, has criti-
cized the introduction of potent chemical agents which are largely un-
tested for adverse public health effects. He remarked: "[Clancer rates
have gone up one percent a year since 1933 . . .and by 3.8 percent in
1975. There is no question that cancer is a major epidemic, and the
environment and what man has done to it is indeed a major source for
this great killer."'' 0
The Council of Environmental Quality concurred with this view in
its sixth annual report.10 It noted that of approximately two million
known chemicals, only 6,000 have been tested in the laboratory for
carcinogenic properties. Furthermore, the report continued, a thousand
people every day are killed by cancer; one out of four is likely to con-
107. Pesticides are not the only means of preventing loss to pests. There are
bioenvironmental controls such as: (1) breeding pest resistance into crop plants; (2)
improving crop management practices, e.g., crop rotation; (3) utilizing parasites and
predators, e.g., augmentation and conservation of natural enemies; and (4) genetic
manipulation and sexual sterility of the pests. Bioenvironmental controls have the poten-
tial to reduce pest losses and environmental pollution by pesticides, while more effec-
tively utilizing energy for pest control. Interestingly, all this can be accomplished at a
lower cost. See Pimentel, Bioenvironmental Control of Pests: A Research Assessment,
supra note 11, at 9-12. The EPA administrator has encouraged the use of these methods
for pest control, but adoption of bioenvironmental controls has not gathered wide
support. [19771 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1991.
Why pesticides have remained the principal method of pest control is a question
that lends itself to resolution in an economic-sociological aura. Surely, human conveni-
ence is one of the prime factors. There are numerous pesticides on the market, readily
available, easily applicable, and supposedly inexpensive.
108. 6 ENvIR. L. REP. 10,031 (1976).
109. What Causes Cancer, NEWSWEEK, January 26, 1976, at 62.
110. Council on Environmental Quality Annual Report (1975), reprinted in
PREVENTION, May 1976, at 204.
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tract it, and sixty to ninety per cent of all cancer is attributed to environ-
mental causes."'
7. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Congress is cognizant of the controversy surrounding the regula-
tion of chemical pollution. Its awareness was evidenced by the passage
of the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976 (TSCA)."2 The relative
strength of this legislation reflects the intent of Congress to provide for
the regulation of toxic substances, a health priority.
The Act requires that a manufacturer submit to the EPA adminis-
trator a "notice of intent" to market a new chemical, or one having a
significant new Use. 13 The notice should contain, among other informa-
tion, "all known data on health and environmental effects.""' This
significant provision places an affirmative duty on the manufacturer to
submit all information and test results, even if they are damaging to the
chances for marketability of the chemical. Hopefully, such explicit and
encompassing requirements will eliminate the concealment of safety
data that has plagued pesticide regulation and control. The manufac-
turer also has a continuing duty to inform the administrator of
"information which reasonably supports the conclusion that "[the] sub-
stance. . . presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment."" 5 The incentive for filing the required information is considera-
ble, with a maximum $25,000 fine for each violation,"' and treatment
of each day of continued violation as a separate offense." 7
The Toxic Substance Control Act takes a significant step in achiev-
ing the aspired goals of pesticide regulation, by giving broad authority
to the administrator to act during the notification period. The adminis-
trator may limit, delay, or prohibit the manufacturing of a suspect
111. Id.
112. Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976). For a full
discussion of the Act, see ROGERS, supra note 7.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (a) (1976).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(a), (b), (d), 2607(b) (1976).
115. This provision, like the registration process in pesticide regulation, may
prove to have all the impact of a Hollywood set-all great facade and no substance. As
ROGERS, supra note 7, at 906-907 points out, "this reporting obligation can succumb
to the rationalizations that the risk isn't all that 'substantial' or the threat of it not
'reasonably' justified."
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) 1 (1976).
117. Id.
1 2:97
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chemical, and his basis for doing so will not be scrutinized by stringent
requirements of proof. If the administrator, having evaluated the data
supplied (1) deems it insufficient or (2) considers that the substance's
use presents an unreasonable risk, then he may limit or prohibit the
manufacturer's marketing of the chemical." 8 The administrator may be
compelled to go to court to justify (1) the injunction pending further
information or (2) the prohibition against manufacturing because antici-
pated uses present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the envi-
ronment." 9
Under the TSCA, the courts will not be able to place an excessive
burden of proof on the administrator to show that the chemical will
adversely affect the environment. In taking steps toward a new ap-
proach to pollutant regulation, Congress lessened the burden of justifi-
cation imposed on the administrator for his actions. He will be able to
justify his limiting or prohibiting decisions on the same basis that has
been evolving in the courts,20 that is, whether an adverse result is "more
likely than not" to result from an action. The administrator will not be
required to offer impossible proofs. He can make his decision in the
balancing of risks and benefits, which disregards the traditional con-
cepts of causal connection,' 2' and resolve "the uncertainties in favor of
concern for possible harm to the environment and public health, and not
for immediate economic advantage."' 22
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (e)(1)(A) (1976).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (e)(2)(A)(B) (1976).
120. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 510 F.2d
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court ignored the traditional concepts of proof in this action
to suspend the registration of the pesticides Aldrin and Dieldrin. The EPA administra-
tor, as the party alleging the harm, was not required to bear the burden of demonstrating
a direct link between the particular substance and the specific damage. He would not,
as determined by the court, be required to prove facts that scientists have been unable
to prove. Id. at 1298. Where the risk involved is so great as to create a strong possibility
that the substance causes a harm, the registrant has a duty of proving the safety of his
product. See also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 176 U.S. App.
D.C. 373, 541 F.2d I, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2263 (1976).
The Eighth Circuit pondered whether an injunction should be granted when the risk
of future environmental harm is not readily ascertainable. The court resolved in favor
of the EPA administrator's decision to phase out the use of lead as a gasoline additive.
The administrator could base his conclusion upon suspected, but not completely sub-
stantiated, relationships between facts, and could make determinations upon theoretical
projections based upon imperfect data.
121. Comm. of Conference, Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976, S. REP. No.
1302, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976). See also Casenote, supra note 97, at 89.
122. This language, first used in Reserve Mining, does reflect a "legislative policy
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Congress also extended broad authority to the administrator and
established the grounds necessary to substantiate his decisions. Such
measures were necessary to assure fulfillment of the Act's purpose,
namely, that all suspect chemicals be tested adequately before the
commencement of the manufacturing process. 23 In order to prevent
exposure to suspect chemicals, action must be taken "before commer-
cial production begins."'2 4 If an injunction were not possible at that
stage, not only would the purpose of the Act.be frustrated,12' but the cost
of removing the chemical from the market would be substantially
greater.'26 The standards which restrict a manufacturer's production of
a chemical reflect an intent by Congress to supplant, at least in the
instance of chemical regulation, the traditional elements of proof re-
quired to be shown before a court will exercise its equitable jurisdiction
to grant an injunction. 27
The impetus for the Toxic Substance Control Act was, as Professor
William H. Rogers had observed, "the technological revolution in the
chemical industry that [had] outflanked thoroughly the traditional legal
judgment not a judicial one." Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
514 F.2d at 500. However, even in the immediate aftermath of Reserve Mining, the
legislature still seemed hesitant to make just such a determination. The courts, in
interpreting the environmental statutes (see Ethyl Corporation (Clean Air Act), Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency (FIFRA)), continued
to prod for a legislative policy decision by noting their restrictions. "We are a court of
law, governed by rules of proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof of
demonstrable hazard to the public health." Reserve Mining v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 498 F.2d at 1084 (from a preliminary injunction hearing which was denied
because the activity of Reserve was not found to be an imminent hazard to health).
Congress, with the Toxic Substance Control Act, took the initiative and set forth
the basis upon which the administrator can render his decisions. Pub. L. No. 94-469,
94th Cong. 2d Sess., 90 STAT. 2003, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4491, at
4554.
123. Id.
124. The Act expresses an intent to avoid a "body count" approach to determine
the health and safety hazards posed by a substance whose effects are dubious, Id. at
4550.
125. The purpose of the Act is to "assure that such innovation and commerce in
such chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1976).
126. Not only is human and environmental harm avoided or alleviated, but the
cost of any regulatory action in terms of loss of jobs and capital investment is mini-
mized. [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 122, at 4550.
127. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 122.
12:1978 119 1
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regimes such as the pesticide laws."u Congress, with this legislation,
clearly intended to put the burden on the manufacturer to develop toxic
substance information, to emphasize the manufacturer's responsibility
for the chemical's possible detrimental effects, and to assess them and
to take corrective measures to alleviate their hazards.' For the first
time, the government is able to gather extensive information 3 ' neces-
sary to make a valid determination of a substance's potentially hazard-
ous tendencies. The Act also contains a citizen-suit provision 3' that will
have substantial impact, since the participating party may be provided
with compensation for attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other
costs. 132 Thus, concerned environmental groups will be able to compete
economically with the rich agribusiness and chemical corporations.
Ostensibly, the "political science of regulation" is losing ground to
a much needed "science of regulation."1 3  The Toxic Substance Con-
trol Act, by requiring the administrator to collect and record all infor-
mation on the attributes of the toxic chemicals, 34 indicates a growing
support by Congress for government acquisition of scientific knowledge.
Although the information is still for the most part supplied by concerned
128. ROGERS, supra note 7, at 899.
129. [19771 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1915.
130. The administrator under section 8 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976)) has
broad power to gather information, keep records, and report health and safety studies.
This power under the TSCA is all encompassing. Unlike § 10 of FIFRA, health and
safety test data will not escape scrutiny and recording because the manufacturer makes
the claim that it is a "trade secret." Douglas Costle, the administrator of the EPA, is
presently pushing to have the pesticide regulations amended to be consistent with the
Toxic Substance Control Act. Again the deficiency of FIFRA is noted. In this instance,
the law is too general and does not expressly state what data may qualify as trade
secrets. Also exhibited is the court's comforting but not curative assistance. The
"narrower view" of what are trade secrets, Costle predicted, would be upheld by courts,
but only after a lengthy legal process. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 280.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(d) (1976).
133. Burger, supra note 2. The political science of regulation is the term used to
categorize the conflict among various interest groups to have legislation and regulations
passed which are favorable to their respective causes. They are more concerned with
regulation for regulation's sake than in the quality and quantity of information available
upon which to render a regulatory decision. Burger contends that "he who controls the
information controls the regulatory activity." The government which has few indepen-
dent sources of its own must make speculative and inconclusive decisions based upon
information supplied by those to be regulated. This has resulted in a prominent lack of
scientific information for regulatory decisions.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976).
1 120 2:1978 1
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interests (manufacturers), the administrator now has the authority to
conduct research, development, and monitoring in pursuit of the objec-
tives of the Act.' Realizing that "he who controls the information for
regulation controls the regulatory activity,"' 3 Congress acted to re-
trieve control from the industry by authorizing the EPA to develop its
own sources of gathering data.
The political clout of the chemical manufacturers and their constit-
uents has not disappeared from the spectra of regulations. The scope of
TSCA is incredibly limited. The act specifically excludes the regulation
of a number of substances, particularly pesticides, which is covered by
another law whose ineffectiveness has been manifested. 3 President
Carter may have erred in his environmental address when he noted that,
with the TSCA, no further comprehensive federal legislation should be
necessary.' Only time will reveal if the Act can be efficaciously en-
135. 15 U.S.C. § 2609 (1976).
136. Burger, supra note 2, at 50,184.
Since information control is so important, it is advantageous for the parties con-
cerned with the character of the regulation to supply the information. Id. Both environ-
mentalists and businesses have an interest in health and environmental regulation. The
environmentalists favor strict legislation fostering economic complacency, while the
businesses encourage a laissez-faire approach, which would promulgate unrestricted
progress, and profit. Therefore, to serve best their own interests, they would neither
encourage the government to collect nor develop its own resources for scientific data.
137. 15 U.S.C. 2602(B) (1976). The term chemical substance does not include:
(I) any mixture.
(II) any pesticide [as defined by 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1976)].
(III) tobacco or tobacco product.
(IV) nuclear material or by-product.
(V) article subject to tax under § 4184 of IRC of 1954 (as amended through
December 31, 1976).
(VI) any food, food additive, drug, cosmetic or device [as defined by FFDCA,
21 U.S.C. § 321 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
138. [19771 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 132 at 133. In his environmental address to
Congress, President Carter noted the necessity of a co-ordinated federal effort to ex-
clude these chemicals from our environment. Idealistically, interagency co-ordination
would offer a better guarantee that hazardous materials would not be allowed to be
mass-produced into our environment. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
Douglas Costle even proposed a transfer of that agency's administration of pesticide
programs to the Office of Toxic Substances.
The integration, however, may only prove to be beneficial for clerical convenience.
In the area of enforcement, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act will
continue to provide the guidelines for registration, record keeping, and cancellation or
suspension of pesticide registration. See note 137 supra. Any attempt by the Administra-
tion to apply wider discretion allowed under the TSCA, or use of any of its other strong
121]112:1978
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forced to achieve successfully the purposes sought by Congress. Also the
Act's authoritative parameters are subject to speculation. If merely
applicable to the straggler substances that have eluded other regulatory
controls, the gap-filling legislation is an enormous gesture with no im-
pact.
While the operative capabilities of the Toxic Substance Control
Act are being determined, the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and
Fungicide Act remains the governing legislation over pesticides. Its in-
adequacies will continue to allow many pesticides to be registered with-
out knowledge of their full effects,"3 9 and tolerances for human con-
sumption to be based on limited questionable information. 40
8. CONCLUSION
Pesticide regulation has undergone heated debate and radical re-
construction in recent years. Whether the result has achieved a success-
ful goal of protecting the health and environment of the American
people is dubious at best. Conflicting interests between environmen-
talists and chemical industrialists have produced only conciliatory legis-
lation.
The pattern is classic. The concerned public relieves its fears by
pressuring for a dramatic gesture from the government, while representa-
tives of the affected industry quietly prepare devices to absorb the pres-
sures. Typically they take the form of enforcement procedures, where
exasperating technicalities and labyrinthine delay mask Federal inaction
in a camouflage of tedium-until the public tumult subsides.''
Such a pattern undermines the regulation of pesticide residue al-
lowed in foodstuffs. The "indemnity provision" was not the only at-
provisions (e.g., citizen suit), will inevitably result in litigation. This is a time-consum-
ing and expensive venture which the EPA would rather avoid. See note 141 infra. Ap-
parently § 2602 of the TSCA, limiting its application, may prove to be the Achilles heel
of the Act, by which a chemical classified as a mixture, pesticide, drug, food additive,
and the like can escape TSCA jurisdiction.
139. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 7, 15, 21. See also note 76, supra.
140. See note 75, supra. Note that the Environmental Chemistry Review Section
identified 120 of approximately 250 pesticide chemicals, for which tolerances have been
established for their residue content in food and animal feeds, that have never undergone
environmental chemistry data review. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 18.
141. H. WELLFORD, supra note 32, at 330.
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tempt to undermine insidiously the power of the EPA. Other instances
include: the establishment of a Pesticide Policy Advisory Committeey
which has pesticide industrialists as members; an attempt to give the
secretary of the USDA veto power over any pesticide classification
decision;' the creation of a Scientific Advisory Commission;' the
requirement of a sixty-day notification before any action can be taken
by the EPA;' and, most recently, the inclusion of a provision on the
FIFRA Extension Bill"' which would provide for congressional review
and possible disapproval of EPA regulations. The "legislative wisdom"
purporting to establish an efficacious regulatory scheme has created a
severe conflict of interest by allowing the proponents of chemicals to test
their own product for defects that may keep them off the market.'
Hopefully, these compromising practices will not continue until the
pesticide industry exclusively controls the entire spectra of regulation.
The courts offer little redress. In the area of environmental contam-
inants, prevention-not subsequent reparation of the damage-is the
logical method of control and enforcement. Most law suits, however,
focus exclusively on past events.' Courts, sympathetic to environmen-
142. PREVENTION, December 1975 at 202-3.
143. Pub. L. No. 94-140; 89 Stat. 751, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1359.
See 6 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,003-33 (1976) for a discussion of proposals and effect of
final provisions. The original version H.R. 8841 proposed to the House was critized by
Russell Train, then the administrator of the EPA. In particular, he cited to the Pooge-
Wampler amendment which would require the EPA to share with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture authority to change the classification of a pesticide, suspend or cancel a
registration, and write regulations. See [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1359,
1374.
144. Id. at 1371; 7 U.S.C. § 136 (d) (1976).
145. Id. All of these provisions deal with administrative review. The details of the
intricacies involved in notification of the Secretary of the U.S.D.A., publication of
notice of intent to cancel registration, and consultation with the Scientific Advisory
Committee are prime examples of "the exasperating technicalities and labyrinthine
delay" that hinder prompt action to remove a pesticide from the market.
146. H. R. 12944 vetoed, H. Doc. No. 585, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976) to extend
FIFRA was vetoed by President Ford, because it contained the provision requiring an
executive agency to submit its regulations to Congress for review and possible veto. See
[1976] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 627.
147. It is doubtful whether the chemical industry, one of the largest and most
powerful in the United States, will, in its economic self-interest, foster restrictions on
productivity, while they expend substantial capital to market a product. See 6 ENVIR.
L. REP. 10,138, 10,042 (1976).
148. Id. Courts in suits for injunction have had difficulty in assessing a risk-
123 1
31
et al.: Pesticide regulation: Why Not Preventive Legislation?
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
Nova Law Journal
tal concerns, palliate the deficiencies of pesticide regulation, but cannot
cure the flaws that allow people to be exposed to the pesticides and their
residues.
Even when successful in removing a pesticide currently on the mar-
ket, the court battles are a time-consuming and expensive method of
regulation for the EPA. The cancellation process of a pesticide registra-
tion is lengthy and the suspension process difficult, since courts are
restricted in their decision-making to the burden of proof required to
establish the likelihood of an event's occurrence.
Pesticide proponents understandably prefer to use the courts as the
means to enforce regulations. They know that the court's assessment of
the potential gravity of a situation is entangled in legalities. Conse-
quently, when the judicial process is circumvented, as was done in the
Mirex "phase-out" used by the EPA, pesticide proponents vociferously
condemn the termination of cancellation hearings. In the Mirex situa-
tion, they criticized the EPA's use of the registration process as a means
to phase out Mirex from the market. The Mirex manufacturers, how-
ever, did not confront the propensity of the harmful effects caused by
the pesticide. They complained, instead, that the EPA's approach was
a wholly inadequate substitute for adjudicatory findings-not legally
justifiable and not based on facts.149
Facts are history-an established actuality; the state of things as
they are. A stringent standard requiring an absolute factual determina-
tion should not be the basis of proof required before restricting the use
of a potent killer. To remove a pesticide from use, it should not be
necessary to establish, merely to satisfy a legal technicality, that the
residue in food consumed by man is a carcinogenic, mutagenic, or tera-
togenic substance.
At present, the responsibility of enforcement of FEPCA is lodged
with the administrator of the EPA. In justifying his decisions, he is not
benefit analysis, as pointed out in Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Environmental law marks a domain where knowledge is hard to obtain and ap-
praise, even in the administrative context; in the courtrooms, difficulties of understand-
ing are multiplied. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury:
A Need for Reform, 45 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1025, 1026-28 (1972).
For courts limiting review to procedural basis, see Latham v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d.
677 (9th Cir. 1974), National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973).
149. [19761 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 849.
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confined to legal standards of proof. Scientific expertise, familiarity
with specific issues, and insight into the development of an environmen-
tally sensitive situation assist him in the risk assessment, which focuses
toward future consequences. 5 However, his decisions are subject to
review by the courts, which lack his insight. Also, whether to take action
against a pesticide is almost exclusively at the discretion of the adminis-
trator.' This "tremendous discretion" has resulted in selective enforce-
ment, which has been greatly criticized by some. Clearly, what is needed
is stricter and more concrete legislation. Regulations that include a
provision for citizens' suits would add another dimension to the enforce-
ment of FIFRA.5 1 Environmentalists and other interested persons could
then compel the administrator to take action against a suspect pesticide.
If strictly legal concepts continue to be employed in pesticide regu-
lation, then the outlook for the acceptance of legislation that will pre-
vent future ill health is bleak. If, in the future, scientific discovery
exhibits with certainty that an extensive and continuous exposure to a
low level of pesticide residues is carcinogenic, the banning of their use
150. Id. See also 6 ENvIR. L. REP. 10,138, 10,042, and Ethyl Corp. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 176 U.S. App. D.C. 373, 541 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
2263 (1976). In discussing the administrator's ability and authority to assess risks, the
court stated that he is not confined by reliance on facts. Those entrusted with enforce-
ment of the laws protecting against "gross environmental modification" are not en-
dowed with "a prescience," which removes speculation from the decision-making. Yet,
there must be regulations and decisions. Consequently, it must be based upon theoretical
and even conflicting data. Such a delicate balancing, the court held, should be left to
the administrator, whose familiarity better qualifies him to make the risk assessment.
Although his decisions may not be based on intuition, most courts will limit their review
to procedural questions, or to whether his decision was arbitrary or capricious. Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
For examples of courts favoring substantive review of agency action, see Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Conservation Council of
North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
151. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976). Agency regulation has its advantages over judicial
implementation of pesticides statutes. However, the administrator has great discretion
whether to take action and has resisted attempts to undermine that power. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d at 289; Environmental Defense
Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d at 346.
152. A citizen suit would allow individual citizens to bring suits against persons,
companies, and governmental agencies, for violations of the Act or for failure to enforce
its provisions. See Comment, supra note 52, at 303. See also note 13 supra, at 2010,
remarks by Senator Nelson; Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1254, 1259-62 (1970).
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will be a futile exercise, as the harm will already have occurred. The
effects of exposure to such carcinogens are insidious, irreversible, and
cumulative.5 3
It may be possible to avoid this disastrous effect if a scientific
approach to legislation is adopted whereby the future health, safety, and
general welfare of the population are considered. An approach such as
this, if adopted, would ban a chemical whose repercussions were not
presently ascertainable. Furthermore, the quest of overcoming the tech-
nological limitations of prognostication of pesticide and chemical ab-
sorption would be propelled. Regulation prior to production and mar-
keting would logically compel manufacturers to discover and rectify
defects or develop alternatives in order to remain economically competi-
tive.
Immediate consideration should be given to the incorporation of a
novel scientific concept in the regulation of environmental contamina-
tion by pesticides and their residues. Then and only then would EPA
enforcement no longer be evaluated critically as "too little, too late and
unpredictable." 154
John P. Wilkes
153. For a discussion of different mortality studies of cancer, see A. LILIENFIELD,
M. LEVIN & I. KESSLER, CANCER IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); for an easy non-
scientific reading on cancer, see R. GLASSER, THE GREATEST BATTLE (1976). See also
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE NATIONAL PANEL OF CONSULTANTS ON THE
CONQUEST OF CANCER, NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANCER (1971).
154. [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 42.
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